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ABSTRACT 
 
The state of the practice in safety has advanced rapidly in recent years with the emergence of 
new tools and processes for improving selection of the most cost-effective safety 
countermeasures.  However, many challenges prevent fair and objective comparisons of 
countermeasures applied across safety disciplines (e.g. engineering, emergency services, and 
behavioral measures).  These countermeasures operate at different spatial scales, are funded 
often by different financial sources and agencies, and have associated costs and benefits that are 
difficult to estimate.  
 
This research proposes a methodology by which both behavioral and engineering safety 
investments are considered and compared in a specific local context.  The methodology involves 
a multi-stage process that enables the analyst to select countermeasures that yield high benefits to 
costs, are targeted for a particular project, and that may involve costs and benefits that accrue 
over varying spatial and temporal scales.  
 
The methodology is illustrated using a case study from the Geary Boulevard Corridor in San 
Francisco, California. The case study illustrates that: 1) The methodology enables the 
identification and assessment of a wide range of safety investment types at the project level; 2) 
The nature of crash histories lend themselves to the selection of both behavioral and engineering 
investments, requiring cooperation across agencies; and 3) The results of the cost-benefit 
analysis are highly sensitive to cost and benefit assumptions, and thus listing and justification of 
all assumptions is required. It is recommended that a sensitivity analyses be conducted when 
there is large uncertainty surrounding cost and benefit assumptions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The state of the practice in safety has advanced rapidly in recent years with the emergence of 
new tools and processes for improving selection of cost-effective behavioral and engineering 
safety countermeasures, such as the FHWA’s comprehensive database of  engineering crash 
modification factors – www.cmfclearinghouse.org (1), the AASHTO Highway Safety Manual’s 
cost benefit analysis procedures for engineering safety countermeasures (2), and cost-benefit 
analysis of behavioral safety measures contained in NCHRP 622,  Effectiveness of Behavioral 
Safety Countermeasures (3).  At the same time, new interdisciplinary planning processes such as 
the Strategic Highway Safety Planning process have created the need to select the most effective 
safety measures regardless of their type (e.g. engineering or behavioral).  However, many 
challenges prevent “apples to apples” comparisons of the cost-effectiveness of engineering and 
behavioral countermeasures.  Comparisons are difficult due to: 
a.  Mismatches in geography. Engineering strategies are frequently site specific, while 
behavioral strategies may be applied across an entire geographic area or population.   For 
example, automated speed enforcement is typically applied along specific corridors but has 
spillover effects to other nearby sites (4, 5).   
b. Mismatches in timing. Engineering investments are made at a specific point in time and 
typically remain effective for several years; some behavioral investments, such as enforcement, 
must be made continually to be effective; and others, such as educational programs, may take 
years of investment before any benefits are realized. 
c. Lack of equivalent quality research across the 4Es. Recent research efforts, such as the 
National Cooperative Highway Research Program 500 series (6) and NCHRP 622 (3), have 
advanced the state of knowledge regarding the effectiveness of engineering, enforcement, and 
behavioral safety strategies. However, for many types of strategies, effectiveness information 
and detailed crash data does not exist or is of poor quality.    
d. Lack of comparable cost information.   Engineering and behavioral programs are often 
funded by different financial sources and agencies, and have different types of costs (capital 
versus ongoing programmatic costs).  Costs are also dependent on level of deployment.  For 
example, it is often uncertain how much investment in a behavioral safety program is sufficient 
to produce desired crash reductions.  
Due to these challenges, few researchers have attempted to compare the costs and 
benefits of both engineering and behavioral safety countermeasures.  This research addresses this 
gap by providing a method for comparing the costs and benefits of both engineering and 
behavioral safety countermeasures implemented in the same or similar contexts.   It involves a 
multi-stage process that enables the analyst to select countermeasures that yield high benefits to 
costs,  and that may involve costs and benefits that accrue over varying spatial and temporal 
scales.    The methodology is demonstrated through application to the Geary Boulevard corridor 
and environs in San Francisco, California.  Four countermeasures were selected for comparison 
(pedestrian engineering improvements, automated enforcement, child pedestrian education 
programs, and DUI checkpoints).  The first two were assumed to be implemented along the 
Geary Corridor, and the second two assumed to be implemented at broader scales.  
The case study illustrates that: 1) The methodology enables the identification and 
assessment of a wide range of safety investments at the project level; 2) the nature of crash 
histories can lend themselves to both behavioral and engineering solutions, requiring cooperation 
across agencies; and 3) the results of the cost-benefit analysis are sensitive to a large number of 
cost and benefit assumptions, and thus requires explicit listing of all assumptions. It is 
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recommended that a sensitivity analyses be conducted when there is large uncertainty 
surrounding cost and benefit assumptions.  
The remainder of this paper begins with a general description of the Geary Corridor.    
Detailed descriptions of selected countermeasures are provided, followed by a demonstration of 
a quantitative cost benefit analysis methodology for evaluating both engineering and behavioral 
countermeasures. A description of crash and economic data including both crash costs and costs 
associated with countermeasures is then provided.  The paper ends with a discussion and 
conclusions.    
 
GEARY CORRIDOR BACKGROUND  
San Francisco has identified traffic safety issues – and particularly pedestrian safety – as 
a major concern in recent years, both throughout the county and on specific high-crash corridors 
such as the Geary Boulevard, a major arterial.  Many different approaches to addressing these 
safety issues are possible.   However, it is uncertain which strategies would provide the greatest 
benefit for the least cost.   This case study examines two-corridor level solutions to safety issues 
along a segment of Geary Boulevard, along with two county-wide approaches that could also 
have benefits for the Geary corridor and the county as a whole. 
Geary Boulevard is an important east-west arterial roadway in the City and County of 
San Francisco serving high volumes of transit, automobile, and pedestrian traffic.  San Francisco 
Municipal Transportation Agency bus service travels along the corridor carrying approximately 
50,000 passengers per day (7).  Between 30,000 and 65,000 daily auto trips and thousands of 
pedestrians and bicyclists utilize the corridor daily (8), due to the proximity of high-density land 
uses including retail services, senior centers, health centers/hospitals, schools, parks and 
playgrounds and residential areas (9). Additionally, a major new bus rapid transit route is 
planned for the corridor (8).  Given its prominence, the safety performance of the corridor is 
critical.    
One 0.8-mile segment of the Geary Corridor from Cook Street to 9th Avenue is the focus 
of this case study, because it has been previously identified as a high injury corridor by the San 
Francisco Pedestrian Safety Task Force (SFPSTF).  The posted speed along this section of the 
corridor is 25 mph, and the 85th percentile speed is about 33 mph (9).  Figure 1, developed by 
the SFPSTF, illustrates severe/fatal pedestrian injuries on the corridor from 2005 to 2009 
(geocoded to the nearest intersection), as well as nearby land uses (hospitals, playing fields, 
schools, senior centers, commercial properties) along this corridor.   
Table 1 illustrates the frequency of all fatalities and injuries along this segment of Geary, 
at intersections along the segment, and a half-mile buffered zone around the corridor from 2005 
to 2010. The table presents fatalities and all injuries resulting from vehicle-vehicle, vehicle-
pedestrian, vehicle-bicyclist, and vehicle-only crashes.   The number of equivalent fatality and 
injury crashes was not readily available for these geographies at the time of analysis;  therefore 
crash ratios (injury to injury crash and fatality to fatality crash) for San Francisco (10) were used 
to convert the number of fatalities and injuries into equivalent crashes (see table footnote).    
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FIGURE 1 GEARY BOULEVARD:  COOK STREET TO 9TH AVENUE – VEHICLE-
PEDESTRIAN INJURIES (2005-2009).    
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TABLE 1 Geary Corridor Segment –Fatalities and Injuries Cook Street to 9th Ave:  2005 to 
2010 
 
 Victims
a  Crashes (Estimated)b 
Location Total Fatalities 
Annual 
Average 
Fatalities  
Total 
Injuries 
Annual 
Average 
Injuries  
Estimated 
Annual 
Average Fatal 
Crashes 
Estimated 
Annual 
Average Injury 
Crashes 
At Intersectionsc  on Geary Focus 
Segment          
  
Vehicle-Vehicle 0 0.00 67 11.17 0 8.1 
Vehicle Only 0 0.00 2 0.33 0 0.2 
Vehicle-Pedestrian 1 0.17 33 5.50 0.17 4.0 
Vehicle –Bicycle 0 0.00 8 1.33 0 1.0 
totals 1 0.17 110 18.33 0.17 13.2 
Geary Corridor Focus Segment            
Vehicle-Vehicle 0 0.00 107 17.83 0 12.8 
Vehicle Only 0 0.00 6 1.00 0 0.7 
Vehicle-Pedestrian 1 0.17 42 7.00 0.17 5.0 
nVehicle –Bicycle 0 0.00 11 1.83 0 1.3 
totals 1 0.17 166 27.67 0.17 19.9 
Within half-mile of Geary 
Segment         
   
Vehicle-Vehicle 1 0.17 768 128.00 0.17 92.2 
Vehicle Only 0 0.00 34 5.67 0 4.1 
Vehicle-Pedestrian 2 0.33 210 35.00 0.33 25.2 
Vehicle-Bicycle 2 0.33 98 16.33 0.33 11.8 
totals 5 0.83 1110 185.00 0.83 133.3 
a   Source:  California Statewide Integrated Traffic Records System (SWITRS) Data Analysis provided by the San 
Francisco Department of Public Health.    
b  Estimated assuming a ratio of 1 fatal crash for each fatality and 0.72 injury crashes for every injury, using San 
Francisco county-wide data 2000-2009 (10) 
c  Defined as crashes occurring <20 feet from an intersection 
 
 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 
This research aims to demonstrate the steps in a cost benefit analysis of remedial actions at a site 
(corridor, region, etc.) involving multiple types of safety countermeasures.   The following steps 
describe the method:    
1. Select countermeasures to be analyzed representing behavioral and engineering 
countermeasures applied at the corridor level or a wider geographic scale as appropriate 
to the type of countermeasure, as determined by the crash history of the site as well as 
known traffic, operational, and behavioral factors.    
2. Specify the level of deployment of each countermeasure.   For engineering 
countermeasures, this primarily involves determining where the countermeasure will be 
implemented (e.g. how many sites).  For behavioral countermeasures,  it often involves 
consideration of not only where the countermeasure will be implemented (e.g. across the 
county, in a portion of the county), but how much investment is necessary to produce 
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crash reductions specified in the research literature (if known). Finally, it can involve 
consideration of spillover effects – for example, if a countermeasure is implemented in 
one geographic location, drivers at similar locations may be affected.    
3. Estimate the crash reduction effectiveness of each countermeasure using available 
crash modification factors from the safety research literature or other current, reputable 
sources.   
4. Specify the time period of during which the countermeasure will be effective.  This 
involves considering not only how long the countermeasure will be operable (e.g. the 
useful life of new infrastructure or the number of years of funding available for a 
behavioral strategy), but also how long the countermeasure will remain effective after it 
is installed or implemented.  Some behavioral countermeasures, for example, remain 
effective even after the funded deployment period.    
5. Estimate countermeasure costs given the level of deployment.    
6. Estimate the target injuries and fatalities that could potentially be affected by the 
countermeasure.    This study focuses on fatal and injury crashes and ignores property 
damage only crashes due to the much higher social and economic costs associated with 
the former.   
7. Estimate countermeasure benefits and calculate a benefit cost ratio.   
 
Consideration of all these factors allows comparison of a diverse set of countermeasures 
implemented at different levels of geography and for different time periods of implementation.   
 
Countermeasure Effectiveness, Level of Deployment, and Costs   
Four potential countermeasures were selected as candidates for addressing safety on the Geary 
corridor and in the surrounding areas of San Francisco:   
1. Improvement of pedestrian median islands (corridor level); 
2. Automated enforcement (corridor level and adjacent areas);  
3. School pedestrian training programs (county level); and 
4.  Sobriety checkpoints (county level). 
 
These countermeasures were selected by drawing on the recommendations of prior studies (7, 8, 
9, 11, 12) and through reference to national studies identifying behavioral countermeasures for 
which quantitative effectiveness information is available (3, 13).  Each countermeasure is 
described below along with key assumptions used in the analysis.   
 
 Improved Pedestrian Refuges 
A recent study of the Geary focus segment (12) recommended provision of improved pedestrian 
medians to reduce pedestrian exposure to vehicular traffic and provide a refuge for pedestrians 
crossing the busy arterial roadway.  Raised medians are available along the corridor, but at ten of 
the fourteen intersections in the focus segment the raised medians do not extend into the 
pedestrian crosswalk.   This countermeasure would involve extending existing medians to serve 
as pedestrian refuges at the ten intersections.  The following describes the assumptions used to 
calculate the benefits and costs of this countermeasure in the Geary corridor:  
• Geographic level of deployment:  This case study assumes that medians would be 
improved at ten intersections along the Geary focus segment to provide a refuge for 
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crossing pedestrians.   Two extensions would be provided per intersection (no extensions 
provided along minor cross-streets).   
• Duration of impact:  Effectiveness is assumed to remain constant over the expected 
useful life of the countermeasure (estimated to be twenty years). 
• Crash reduction effectiveness:  No crash reduction factors could be identified 
specifically for extension of an existing median into the pedestrian right of way at 
signalized intersections.  The closest available factor was 46 percent reduction in 
pedestrian crashes due to provision of a new median island where none existed 
previously (13) and this crash modification factor is applied for the case study.    Due to 
the uncertainty regarding the applicability of this CRF to the extension of existing median 
islands along Geary,  it should be treated as an upper bound of the potential crash 
reduction available from median extensions. 
• Cost:  According to the San Francisco MTA, provision of a new median island 
typically costs between $10,000 and $75,000 (14).  The lowest end of the cost range 
($10,000) was assumed to be adequate for extending an existing median island into the 
pedestrian right of way.  This yields a total cost of  $20,000 per intersection (two median 
extensions provided per intersection) or a $200,000 up-front cost for ten intersections.  
Medians are assumed not to have landscaping or require ongoing maintenance.     
 
Automated Speed Enforcement 
Automated cameras can be used to reduce speeding at intersections and along corridors.   
Automated cameras record a vehicle’s speed using radar or other instrumentation and take a 
photograph of the vehicle when it exceeds a threshold limit, issuing citations to registered 
owners or vehicle drivers.  
The SFPSTF’s High‐Injury Corridor Case Study (9) recommended specific enforcement 
strategies for the Geary focus segment calling for “enforcement activities targeting pedestrian 
right of way” and “enforcement activities targeting vehicle speed”.  Given the effectiveness of 
this proven countermeasure and the noted 85th percentile speed of 33 mph in a 25 mph zone, the 
use of automated speed enforcement represents a logical and defensible safety strategy.   
Automated enforcement relies on general deterrence theory to realize the full safety 
benefit of the program.  Operationally, drivers are thought to change their behavior in response 
to camera-enforced locations, and develop a heightened awareness as to the dangers of risks 
(financial and safety) of speeding.   This means that drivers who hear about the program may 
change their behavior even if they are not actually ticketed. The following describes the 
assumptions used to calculate the benefits and costs of this countermeasure if deployed as a pilot 
program along the Geary focus segment:     
• Geographic level of deployment:  This case study assumes that mobile speed cameras 
would be placed along the Geary focus segment.   However, spillover effects – that is 
safety impacts at non-instrumented intersections – are expected and often observed upon 
careful evaluation.   One study documented both positive (e.g. additional crashes 
reduced) and negative (additional crashes generated due to traffic diversion) effects 
measured from within 500 meters on either side of the study corridor to within 5 
kilometers of the corridor (16).  Since spillover effects are well established, this study 
assumes positive effects would extend to a half-mile buffered area on either side of the 
corridor.   The study further assumes the use of mobile cameras would eliminate the 
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possibility of negative spillover effects, which have been primarily associated with fixed 
cameras (16).   
• Duration of impact:   Cameras are assumed to be effective while implemented, and 
are assumed to be implemented for a twenty-year period (for comparability to other 
countermeasures).     
• Crash reduction effectiveness:  Much research has shown automated enforcement 
programs to be effective (4, 5, 16, 17).   A recent review of 35 studies found the typical 
range of reduction in the proportion of speeding vehicles in the 10-35 percent, and typical 
crash reductions of 14 to 25 percent in the vicinity of the cameras (17).    For this study, a 
value of 20 percent reduction in all crashes (representing the midpoint of 14 and 25), is 
used.      
• Cost:  The cost of automated speed enforcement depends on the type and number of 
cameras used.   For this study, cameras are assumed to be leased and not purchased.  
Prior studies have estimated a monthly cost of $2.1k to 2.4k lease of a pole- or cab-
mounted camera (13), or an annual cost of approximately $27,000 per camera.  Other 
configuration options include cabinet or trail mounted cameras and configuration for 
speeding and/or red light running.    Another key consideration is the number of cameras 
used.  For this study, it is assumed two cameras would be sufficient to produce crash 
reductions within the Geary corridor focus segment and buffered area.  This is based on 
prior studies summarized in Table 2.   The two population-based studies suggest 
approximately 1 camera per 100,000 people is sufficient to produce significant crash 
reduction.  Population within a square-mile buffer of the Geary corridor was not 
calculated for this study;  however, the area represents less than one percent of the land 
area of San Francisco, which has a population of about 800,000.  The corridor study 
suggests about 1 camera per mile is sufficient along a highway corridor.   Taken together, 
these studies suggest two cameras should be more than sufficient to produce crash 
reductions along the mile-long segment of Geary from Cook to 9th and in a buffered area 
around the corridor.     
 
Table 2 Mobile Speed Enforcement Studies – Level of Deployment 
Study Area 
Study Area 
Population/ Mileage Time Period 
Number of Cameras 
Used During Study 
Period 
Crash Reduction 
Percentages 
Victoria, Australia (most 
cameras and population in 
Melbourne)   
4 million people (in 
1985)  
1983-1991 54 cameras 20% reduction in 
daytime crashes 
statewide   
Highway Corridor in British 
Columbia, Canada 
22 km (13.7 miles) 1994-1998 12 cameras 16% reduction in all 
crashes along the 
corridor 
Province of British Columbia, 
Canada 
~3.5 million people 
average during period 
1991-1997 30 cameras 25% reduction in 
daytime speed-related 
crashes statewide  
Source: Decina et al, 2007 (16).  Population figures estimated from the  British Columbia Bureau of Statistics (BC 
Stats) the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
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Sobriety Checkpoints 
Approximately 10 percent of all crashes in San Francisco involve alcohol use (18). Sobriety 
checkpoints are a proven effective method for reducing alcohol-involved crashes.   Sobriety 
checkpoints are traffic stops where drivers’ level of alcohol impairment is assessed by law 
enforcement officers.  The aim of implementing the checkpoints is to achieve general deterrence 
for minimizing an undesirable behavior.    Motorists are expected to have an increased sense of 
risk from their increased awareness, resulting in a change in behavior.  The following describes 
the assumptions used to calculate the benefits and costs of this countermeasure if deployed 
throughout San Francisco as a whole:   
• Geographic level of deployment:  This case study assumes that checkpoints would be 
implemented throughout San Francisco.      
• Duration of impact:  The program is assumed to be put in place for a twenty year 
period.  Some research has suggested that driving under the influence programs remain 
effective two years after conclusion of the program (e.g., one year of funding provides 
three years of benefit (19). This assumption is built into the average annual cost estimate.  
• Crash reduction effectiveness:  A national review of the effectiveness of sobriety 
checkpoints found programs typically reduce alcohol related crashes by approximately 20 
percent (3).    
• Cost:  Countywide sobriety checkpoint programs were estimated to cost 
approximately  $1.50 per-capita,  this is based on a the cost of implementation of a 
statewide program in Connecticut in 2003 and adjusted to 2010 dollars (3).  The value is 
divided by three to reflect that costs would need to be paid only once in three years, 
because program benefits are assumed to last two years beyond the conclusion of a one-
year program.  This yields an annualized cost of $0.50 per resident, or about $400,000 
per year given San Francisco’s resident population of 800,000.     
 
School Pedestrian Training Programs 
A recent national review (3) found school-aged pedestrian training programs for children 
are a low-cost, proven effective countermeasure for reducing child pedestrian injuries.  Programs 
teach young children about the risks and proper behavior associated with the transport system, 
such as proper procedure at marked crossings, the dangers of unmarked crossings, the risks of 
walking at night (visibility concerns), and the lack of protection offered to pedestrians during 
crashes with motor vehicles. 
The SFPSTF’s High‐Injury Corridor Case Study (9) made recommendations for 
educational and outreach strategies aimed at pedestrians.  With many schools, parks, and 
playgrounds surrounding the Geary Corridor focus segment (see Figure 1), attention focused on 
improving children’s pedestrian behaviors. The following describes the assumptions used to 
calculate the benefits and costs of this countermeasure if deployed  at selected schools 
throughout the county:  
• Geographic level of deployment:  This case study assumes that twenty percent of 
schools in San Francisco would be targeted for inclusion in the program (25 out of 125 
middle and elementary schools in San Francisco).  
•   Duration of impact:   It is assumed this program would be funded on an annual basis 
and that it would  remain effective only while funded.  This is a conservative estimate 
reflecting lack of research on the long-term effects of pedestrian safety training programs.   
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• Crash reduction effectiveness:   A national review of behavioral safety 
countermeasures found estimated child pedestrian safety training programs typically 
reduce crashes among this population by 12 percent (3).    
• Cost:  The cost of implementing a pedestrian safety training program at a single 
school in San Francisco is estimated at  $25,000 annually.  This estimate is based on a 
$500,000 Safe Routes to Schools grant funding supporting program deployment at 10 
San Francisco elementary schools per year, 2009 to 2011 (20).  The total annual cost of 
implementation at twenty-five schools would be $625,0000.   
 
Estimating Target Crashes  
The next step is estimating ‘target crashes’— that is those crashes that could be influenced by the 
chosen countermeasures.  As stated previously, in this case study, the countermeasures will 
influence crashes at a variety of spatial scales, and so care must be taken to identify correctly 
those crashes that can and will be influenced by the safety investments.   The following describes 
the specific assumptions used to estimate target crash estimates.    
 
Median Island Extensions 
• Median island extension would be placed at ten of the fourteen intersections, or 71 
percent of intersections (10/14 = 71 percent) along the focus segment (remaining four 
intersections already have treatments).    
• All pedestrian-vehicle related injuries and fatalities at targeted intersections could 
potentially be affected.    
• Approximately 0.17 vehicle-pedestrian fatality and 4 vehicle-pedestrian injury 
crashes per year occur on average on all intersections in the focus segment combined 
(Table 1).    Because the median extensions will be placed at 71 percent of the 
intersections, it is estimated that  71 percent of pedestrian crashes could be affected (0.12 
fatality and 2.8 injury crashes potentially affected).    
 
Automated Speed Enforcement Cameras  
• Two mobile speed enforcement cameras would be placed along the target segment.   
• Cameras could potentially affect all fatality and injury crashes in a half mile buffered 
area surrounding the segment (estimated 0.83 fatality and 133 injury crashes on average 
per year, from Table 1).   
• Crashes outside the buffered area could also be affected, but are not included in the 
analysis to maintain a conservative estimate. 
 
Countywide Pedestrian Training Programs  
• Twenty percent of schools in San Francisco would be targeted for inclusion in the 
program (25 out of 125 middle and elementary schools in San Francisco).     
• In 2009, 21 fatal and 699 injury crashes involving pedestrians occurred in San 
Francisco (10).  Approximately 7 percent of these, or 1.5 fatal and 49 injury crashes, are  
estimated to have involved child pedestrians.  This estimate was derived using the ratio of 
child (age less than 15)  pedestrian injuries and fatalities to all pedestrian injuries and 
fatalities in San Francisco in 2009 (18).       
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• If 20 percent of schools are included in the pedestrian training program, about 20 
percent of the total number of child pedestrian crashes, or 0.3 and 10 fatal and injury 
crashes, respectively, could potentially be addressed each year.   
 
Sobriety Checkpoint Program  
• The program would involve a  countywide comprehensive program hiring officers 
(over-time) to conduct a systematic program of checkpoints. 
•  Alcohol-involved injury and fatality crashes would be affected.  On average in San 
Francisco between 2005 and 2009, 3.2 fatal and 145.6 injury driving under the influence 
crashes occurred annually (10).  
•  Two comprehensive sobriety checkpoint programs involving associated publicity 
campaigns in Maryland and Delaware resulted in an average of 35 percent of the local 
population hearing of the program (21).    It is assumed that the same level of awareness 
could be achieved among San Francisco residents, and this would result in approximately 
35 percent of alcohol-related injuries and fatalities being potentially addressed by the 
program (1 fatality and 51 injury crashes annually).   
 
Calculating Benefits and Costs  
Table 3 illustrates the calculation of benefit-cost ratios for each countermeasure.  While all safety 
investments will impact the corridor, engineering countermeasures (pedestrian refuges) installed 
in the corridor will influence crashes only within the focus sub-segment.  Automated 
enforcement is assumed to impact the sub-segment and crashes within a 0.5 mile buffer.  
Pedestrian and DUI countermeasures impact crashes at the county level.    
Crash reductions are calculated by multiplying the target fatality and injury collisions 
listed in the second and third columns of the table by the crash reduction factors in the fourth 
column.   These are converted to monetary benefits by multiplying by unit fatality and injury 
costs.  The unit fatality crash cost of $5.4 million is drawn from a NHTSA review of crash costs 
(22).  The unit injury cost is based on the weighted average severity of injuries occurring in the 
half-mile buffered area around the Geary focus segment, also using injury collision costs from 
the NHTSA review (22).  These are converted to net present value of benefits using a 20 year 
implementation period and a discount rate of 4 percent.     
Countermeasure costs are also summarized in the table and converted to a net present 
value over a twenty year implementation period.  The net present benefit and cost ratio is then 
provided in the final column, showing that all selected safety investments have positive benefit 
to cost ratios, and importantly ratios greater than unity.  The highest benefit to cost is associated 
with the automated speed enforcement pilot project, followed by pedestrian median extensions, 
sobriety checkpoints, and lastly pedestrian school training programs.   
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TABLE 3 Estimated Ratio of Net Present Benefits to Costs for Geary Corridor Safety Improvements – Assuming 20-Year 
Implementation Period for all Countermeasures 
 
Countermeasu
re and Scale of 
implementatio
n  
Estimated Annual 
Target Crashes Estimated Annual Crash Reduction Estimated Net Present Worth of Benefits Estimated Net Present Worth of Costs 
Fatality 
Crashes 
Injury 
Crashes 
Crash 
Reduction 
Factor  
Estimated 
Fatality 
Crash 
Reduction 
(CRFxFat) 
Estimated 
Injury  
Crash 
Reduction 
(CRFxInj) 
Fatality 
Crash 
Benefit (Unit 
Cost 
$5,389,000) 
Average 
Injury  
Crash 
Benefit 
(Unit Cost 
$384,000) 
Total 
Estimated Net 
Present 
Benefitsa 
Capital 
Costs  
(Initial) 
Annual 
Ongoing 
Costs 
Total 
Estimated 
Net 
Present 
Costsa BCR 
Pedestrian 
Median 
Extensionsb 
0.12 2.8 46% 0.06 1.29 $297,473 $664,608 $13,074,992 $200,000 n/a $200,000 65 
Automated 
speed 
enforcement 
camerasb 
0.83 133 20% 0.17 25.94 $872,210 $13,382,460 $193,725,612 n/a $54,000 $733,878 264 
School 
Pedestrian 
Training 
Program 
(County)c 
0.3 10 12% 0.04 1.20 $194,004 $619,200 $11,051,708 n/a $625,000 $8,493,954 1 
Sobriety 
Checkpoints  
(County)c 
1 51 20% 0.20 10.20 $1,077,800 $5,263,200 $86,176,259 n/a $400,000 $5,436,131 16 
a Project costs and benefits are converted to a net present value using a 4 percent discount rate and assuming each project is implemented for twenty years.  Net present value factor for a 20 year 
series = 13.59 
b Implemented along the Geary focus segment  (including spillover effects within a 0.5 mile buffer for automated enforcement).  
c Implemented throughout the county.   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Areas of Uncertainty 
All cost benefit studies require assumptions across a variety of steps.  The assumptions in this 
analysis are described and justified throughout the report.  Some of the more uncertain 
assumptions are discussed below, along with sensitivity analysis. 
 
Uncertain CRF for Pedestrian Median Extensions 
A CRF for pedestrian median extension at a signalized intersection was not available.  The most 
similar available CRF was used (provision of a new median at an uncontrolled marked crossing 
with CRF of 46%).   However, even if the actual CRF is much lower for median extensions (for 
example, 10 percent), the benefit-cost ratio for this strategy would still be high (BCR of 18), 
given the low up-front costs and long project life.    
 
Uncertain Extent of Spillover Effects for Automated Enforcement 
 Automated enforcement is assumed to have positive spillover effects to adjacent intersections, 
based on literature showing that programs typically effect intersections within 500 m to 2.5 km 
on either side of the targeted corridor (16). This study conservatively assumes positive spillover 
effects to intersections within a ½ mile buffer on either side of the corridor.  The potential for 
broader spillover effects beyond the corridor are ignored, although broader impacts have been 
shown in some studies.   Automated enforcement can also have negative spillover effects if 
drivers are aware of fixed camera locations and avoid them, causing higher crash rates on 
adjacent streets (16).  This study assumes mobile cameras would be implemented to avoid 
negative spillover effects, which have been primarily associated with fixed cameras.    
 
Uncertain Costs for Automated Enforcement 
Automated enforcement is assumed to cost $27,000 annually per intersection to lease cameras. If 
cameras are purchased instead of leased, the cost-benefit ratios could change significantly.   
Additionally, automated enforcement programs are frequently revenue-positive to the 
implementing agency (23) e.g., fines equal or more than offset implementation costs; therefore, 
the cost-benefit ratio to the implementing agency is very high.   Nevertheless, the public still 
bears the cost of program implementation.    
 
Uncertain Duration of Effectiveness for Pedestrian Training Programs  
Pedestrian training programs were assumed to be effective only while funded, due to limited 
research on the long-term impacts of these types of programs.    However, it is possible that 
multiple years of pedestrian safety education could produce changes in children’s habits that 
could last well after program completion.  This area deserves further study as the assumption of 
no lasting effects reduces the benefit to cost ratio.   
 
Conclusions  
This case study defined a methodology that allows comparison of the benefits and costs of 
engineering and behavioral countermeasures simultaneously.   It demonstrates several important 
points: 
• First, a careful and comprehensive analysis will involve a large number of 
assumptions.  These assumptions may involve a significant level of uncertainty, and thus 
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need to be clearly documented in the process. The assumptions include details of the 
spatial and temporal influence of countermeasures, and countermeasure costs and 
benefits.   In particular, the amount of time countermeasures remain effective after 
implementation, and the level of deployment necessary to produce crash reductions 
documented in the research literature, are subject to significant uncertainty and deserving 
of further research. It is anticipated that much debate will ensue over analysis 
assumptions, and thus detailed documentation will be necessary to defend and support an 
analysis.  
• A second insight is that benefit-to-cost results are quite sensitive to assumptions.  
Given this sensitivity, it may be advisable to use ranges of assumptions and estimate the 
benefit to cost ratios at the median, upper, and lower assumed values. This approach will 
lead to more informed decision making, especially if the set of countermeasures if 
controversial.  
• Thirdly, a sensible safety investment program is  likely to involve both engineering 
and behavioral safety investments for a large majority of projects. This is evident because 
of the fundamental knowledge linking a majority of crashes to behavioral factors. 
Linking both behavioral and engineering factors in a single benefit-cost analysis is a 
useful exercise, as it is likely to engage multiple safety stakeholders, will assist in 
identifying flexible funding sources, and will serve to transfer knowledge between 
engineers and behavioral safety specialists.          
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